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ABSTRACT 
Was Spanish fiscal policy destabilizing? We estimate policy reaction functions and test 
the impact of fiscal shocks on growth volatility over the period 1950–1998.  We find 
that a transition from pro-cyclical to countercyclical fiscal policy occurred in the late 
years of the Franco regime, contributing to the stabilization of the growth pattern. The 
timing of the shift, between the late 1960s and early 1970s, was not determined by a 
single policy change, but rather by gradual pressure from economic liberalization, the 
external constraint imposed by a fixed exchange rate regime and the modernization of 
fiscal policy instruments. The aggressiveness of fiscal shocks also decreased over time, 
thus contributing to the progressive stabilization of output growth. There appears to be 
little necessity to appeal to a ‘Great Moderation’ of monetary policy to understand the 
greater stability of the Spanish economy from the 1980s 
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Introduction 
Has fiscal policy been stabilizing or destabilizing? Has government spending and 
taxation smoothed or exacerbated the volatility of the growth process? Whether 
stabilizing or destabilizing, the rise of big government in the twentieth century almost 
certainly influenced fluctuations in economic activity. It follows that changes of 
economic or political regime may have altered the pattern of growth and its volatility. 
Indeed falling volatility (the so-called ‘Great Moderation’) has been observed in most 
industrialized countries over the last quarter of the 20th century. However, its connection 
with changes in the conduct of macroeconomic policy has been explored only in 
relation with monetary policy (Stock and Watson 2003). Indeed, empirical studies 
suggest that fiscal policy in both industrialized and developing countries has been much 
less countercyclical or acyclical (thus stabilizing) than suggested by either standard 
Keynesian models or Barro-type tax smoothing models (Fatás and Mihov 2008 and 
2009). 
This paper explores these questions and propositions for a half century of Spanish 
experience. Our concern is not only to assess whether fiscal policy increased or reduced 
output volatility but also to establish whether it did so systematically so that fiscal 
policy regimes can be identified in the form of reaction functions. 
In the case of Spain, fiscal policy is especially prominent since monetary policy 
emerged later than in most of the rest of Western Europe as an autonomous instrument 
of economic policy. During the 1950s, the central bank guaranteed unconditional 
liquidity to the government and the public sector through the automatic discount of 
public debt. This policy was discontinued only in 1962, when the Bank of Spain was 
nationalised and put under the control of the Ministry of Finance, but quantitative credit 
schemes remained the main instrument of monetary intervention and the monetary base 
was hardly managed (Poveda 1972). Only in 1973 did monetary policy come of age, 
with broad money and then private sector liquidity used as intermediate target, and bank 
reserves as the  instrumental target (replaced by short-term interest rate after 1984) 
(Aríztegui 1990; Ayuso and Escrivá 1998). However, recent studies (Gadea et al. 2008; 
Bajo Rubio et al. 2010) contend that fiscal dominance (a regime under which fiscal 
deficits determine the path of money creation and the sustainability of fiscal policy is 
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achieved through adjustments in the price level) prevailed for most of the postwar 
period, and was not clearly reversed until the 1990s, when the Bank of Spain gained 
formal independence. 
Even so, little attention has been paid to the contribution of fiscal policy to Spanish 
macroeconomic volatility in the period of most rapid economic growth, the quarter of 
century after 1950.  For the post-1980 period, some studies suggest that fiscal policy 
stabilised private consumption and output growth, mainly thanks to an expansion of 
welfare provisions and the increasing size of the public sector (Dolado et al. 1993, 
Gómez 1993, Marín 1997). In the other direction, De Castro (2003) estimated that for 
the period 1980-2001, government spending shocks were the most important exogenous 
source of output volatility, explaining 15 per cent of GDP variance at a one-year 
horizon. 
 
Our original contribution is threefold. First, we provide a much longer perspective on 
the conduct of fiscal policy than the current empirical literature, which usually is limited 
to the post-1970 period. Second, we shed light on changes in fiscal behaviour of 
governments in the transition from autocracy to democracy, thus contributing to the 
literature on fiscal policy under authoritarian polities. Third, we uncover shifts in fiscal 
policy regimes and provide empirical evidence of their impact on output volatility over 
time. In so doing we offer an alternative to  the ‘Great Moderation’ of monetary policy 
as an explanation for the enhanced stability of the Spanish economy from the 1980s.  
Section 1 outlines the conceptual framework of the paper and surveys the existing 
literature. Section 2 discusses the history and institutions of Spanish fiscal policy in the 
years 1950 to 1998. Section 3 empirically estimates government’s reaction functions—
that is, the impulse-response dynamics of fiscal policy and output—using both a 
Structural VAR framework and an instrumental variable approach. Section 4 focuses on 
the time-varying magnitude of discretionary fiscal shocks and measures their impact on 
growth volatility. 
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1. Fiscal policy and the cycle: theory and empirical literature 
Growth cycles may be represented as the response of the economy to a series of random 
shocks. Most instability originates on the demand side of the economy, which fiscal 
policy both influences and reacts to. Three elements of fiscal policy can be 
distinguished: a cyclical, non-discretionary component, determined by automatic 
stabilizers such as tax revenues (pro-cyclical) or unemployment benefits 
(countercyclical); a discretionary and systematic component, that is, deliberate and 
systematic responses of the government to the state of the economy; and a discretionary 
and non-systematic component, that is, budget decisions not related to economic 
fluctuations. Any of the three components can be responsible for a change in the growth 
cycle pattern. 
Fiscal policy influences growth volatility primarily through structural features of the 
fiscal regime. These structural characteristics include the size of the public sector, and 
therefore the proportion of GDP devoted to public spending and taxation, and the 
composition of tax receipts and expenditures. A small government sector has a smaller 
stabilising or destabilising impact, other things being equal. Modern fiscal regimes, 
based on a progressive tax system and large spending on unemployment benefits and 
other subsidies related to economic fluctuations, exhibit greater stabilizing properties 
than regimes with regressive taxation and spending concentrated on government 
purchases (van den Noord et al. 2000, pp. 6-8; Andrés et al. 2007). In fact Gali (1994) 
finds a significant stabilizing effect of government size on GDP variability in a sample 
of OECD countries in the period 1960-90 as do Fatás and Mihov (2001) for a similar 
sample and period, after controlling for additional factors such as international 
openness. More recent studies suggest that the stabilizing effect of government size may 
have significantly declined since the 1980s (Mohanty and Zampolli 2009). The latter 
evidence is consistent with the decline of fiscal multipliers observed by Perotti (2005).  
The second element, systematic discretionary responses to cyclical fluctuations, can be 
modelled by ‘reaction functions’ (Fatás and Mihov 2003) or ‘fiscal rules’ (Gali and 
Perotti 2003). Non-systematic discretionary changes are “fiscal shocks”, that is, changes 
in the fiscal stance that are  exogenous to the economy and to built-in characteristics of 
the tax and spending process (such as implicit or explicit rules and the institutional 
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arrangements). Denoting g as the growth of real government spending (net of automatic 
stabilizers), and y as output and demand growth, the discretionary systematic 
component of policy is measured by the parameter c in the reaction function 
  g  = c1 (y - y*) + ug      (1) 
where y* is a target output growth, y is the realized (or expected) growth rate, and non-
systematic discretionary changes in spending are represented by ug, which are ‘political 
shocks’.  
The impact of fiscal policy is through an aggregate demand or, say, an IS function, 
where uy represents demand shocks; 
y = b(g) + uy      (2) 
Substituting the reaction function in the IS function, growth of spending is dampened 
when c1 <0; discretionary policy is stabilising. When c1 >0 aggregate demand growth is 
reinforced by government expenditure; policy exacerbates cyclical fluctuations. Figure 
1 illustrates. 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
A positive demand shock, such as a rise in the demand for exports, shifts the IS or 
aggregate demand function upwards in figure 1. A boom begins but fiscal policy 
reaction is to stabilise, so g is cut back and short run output expansion is less than in the 
absence of reaction. A reaction function with the opposite gradient represents a 
destabilising government. In the long run increased government spending has no effect 
on output or aggregate demand (as a first approximation – ignoring possible crowding 
out of productive investment), because it is simply redistributive.  
In the model of figure 1, long run fiscal equilibrium in a static economy requires that 
taxes cover government spending including debt service. Otherwise debt is 
accumulating or decumulating, which is not sustainable in the long run. We assume tax 
revenues adjust somehow. The impact of the government spending change depends 
upon these taxes. But in the short run on the reaction function the government can run 
up or run down debt as necessary. The IS, aggregate demand or impact function, how 
spending affects income and output, assumes tax revenues are endogenous, part of the 
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function. The impact of spending on income is less the larger is  the marginal propensity 
to pay taxes. Greater ‘automatic stabilisation’ reduces the gradient of the impact 
function in figure 1. Tax shocks are subsumed in shocks to income or output. 
Government systematic policy might be stabilising but non-systematic discretionary 
policy may still increase the volatility of output growth. Figure 1 can be manipulated to 
show these shocks shifting the reaction function and exercising a stronger short run 
effect on output, the steeper is the impact function. The more ‘aggressive’ is 
discretionary non-systematic fiscal policy, the greater the amplitude of shifts in the 
reaction function and of the business cycle.  
As far as the relationship between the fiscal stance of the government and fluctuations 
of the economy is concerned, empirical studies show that over the last forty years fiscal 
policy was persistently pro-cyclical in developing countries, thus adding to their 
macroeconomic instability. The traditional explanation of pro-cyclicality is that fiscal 
policy suffers from substantial lags in recognition, action and effects, thus affecting the 
economy when the circumstances that triggered a change in the fiscal stance have 
vanished (Stein 1969). Recent studies suggest, on the contrary, that booms enhance 
governments’ ability to borrow and therefore to spend (Gavin and Perotti 1997; 
Kaminsky et al. 2004). Others argue that spending pressures increase during expansions 
due to political distortions created by high tax base volatility (Talvi and Végh 2005) or 
by voters’ demand in corrupted political systems (Alesina et al. 2008).  
A complementary hypothesis is the “voracity effect”. Institutional conditions such as 
political fragmentation may tend to intensify lobbying and the struggle between power 
blocs for the appropriation of fiscal revenues during economic booms, when revenues 
become more abundant (Lane and Tornell 1996; Tornell and Lane 1999; Lane 2003). 
Government spending and deficits may be expected to rise with the upswing of the 
cycle in regimes that must assuage influential pressure groups (unions, big business, the 
army, religious bodies, regional separatists) to remain in power. Moreover for insecure 
governments information flows can be attenuated because open policy debate becomes 
subversive if the ‘wrong’ conclusions might be reached. So spending increases 
excessively without being questioned until an external crisis intervenes and forces 
painful cutbacks. By contrast politically stable regimes may be strong enough to hold 
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back competing forces for greater state spending. They may be able to tolerate open 
policy debate. They may even use their budgets to stabilise the economy, though the 
automatic stabilising role of the tax system with rates unchanged is likely to be more 
prominent than spending changes. Such regimes will show acyclical or countercyclical 
fiscal policies. 
The evidence for OECD countries is mixed on the contrary. Acyclical or countercyclical 
fiscal policy seems to have characterized large industrial countries (Kaminski et al. 
2004; Alesina et al. 2008).1 However, other studies suggest that procyclicality prevailed 
in industrialized countries outside the G7 group (Arreaza et al. 1999; Lane 2003). In 
turn Fatas and Mihov (2009) find that procyclicality was common in EMU countries 
before the introduction of the Euro. In fact results seem to be rather sensitive to the 
variable used to capture fiscal stance, as well as to the sample of countries and the time 
span covered by different studies. 
Fiscal impact may also depend upon the exchange rate regime. In standard models of 
small open economies with nominal rigidities under a pegged nominal exchange rate 
with liberalized capital movements demand management becomes the main tool 
through which a government influences inflation (Marston 1985). Under fixed rates 
fiscal expansion beyond full capacity could trigger a capital outflow in the absence of 
capital controls, bringing the policy to a stop. At below full capacity fiscal policy is an 
effective determinant of aggregate demand; fiscal expansion expands the domestic 
money supply by capital inflows. Under flexible rates with spare capacity, fiscal 
expansion appreciates the exchange rate which, by reducing competitiveness eventually 
offsets the original demand expansion. Beyond equilibrium output, fiscal expansion 
induces inflation, depreciating the exchange rate which boosts demand further. Without 
the exchange rate constraint, fiscal policy can seriously destabilise the economy. An 
additional and important implication is that the fiscal stance becomes a key determinant 
of the credibility of a fixed exchange rate. A stabilizing fiscal policy can therefore be 
considered as an indirect commitment to an announced exchange rate peg, reinforcing 
its credibility (Andersen and Chiriaeva 2007).  
                                                           
1 Alesina et al. (2008, p. 1007) define a policy countercyclical when it adjusts to the tax-
smoothing principle of constant tax rates and discretionary government spending as a fraction of 
GDP over the cycle.  This corresponds to what Kaminsky et al. (2004) regard as an acyclical 
policy. 
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2. Fiscal policy in the transition from autocracy to democracy: a narrative 
As argued in the previous section, three components of fiscal policy may contribute to 
its stabilizing or destabilizing properties: the size of automatic stabilizers (determined 
by the structure of expenditures and taxation), systematic responses to the state of the 
economy, and policy shocks. In turn, discretionary fiscal decisions (both systematic and 
non-systematic) can be influenced by the incentives and constraints created by the 
political economy and the exchange rate regime. In this section we describe the 
profound changes that altered the Spanish fiscal regime in the transition from autocracy 
to democracy. The objective of our narrative is to identify if, how and when, according 
to the existing literature and to contemporary observers, Spanish fiscal policy acted as a 
stabilizing or destabilizing force, and to what extent this was related to political 
changes. 
Until the early 1970s, Franco`s fiscal regime exhibited characteristics that made it 
unsuitable for short-term demand management and left little scope for stabilizing action. 
The size of government was small and automatic stabilizers virtually absent. As Figure 
2 shows, tax revenues and spending of the central government remained below 15 per 
cent of GDP.2 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
Indirect taxation (articulated in a cumulative multiphase tax on sales, taxes on luxury 
goods and excises) accounted for two thirds of total receipts on average, while an 
additional 15 percent of receipts came from import taxes. Tax reforms in 1957 and 1964 
failed to expand the tax base and modernize its structure, and receipts from direct 
taxation remained below 30 per cent of total tax revenues. The transition towards a 
modern, unified social security system began only in 1967 and was completed as late as 
1972, when social security contributions finally outweighed indirect taxes as the main 
source of revenues. Tax collection was weakened by the internal fragmentation of the 
                                                           
2 However government spending was also passing through a myriad of public bodies and 
administrations (Argimón et al. 1999, p.52). A World Bank (1963) team identified in 1962 over 
1,600 autonomous official spending units with less than perfect reporting standards, and was 
obliged to confine their discussion of Spanish public expenditure to central government 
spending, the only category for which they could obtain data. 
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administration, widespread exemptions, ‘tax farming’, and rampant evasion and 
avoidance (Fuentes Quintana 1990, pp. 129-30; Canseco 1978, pp. 145-160; Gunther 
1980, pp. 57-61; Argimón et al. 1999, pp. 51-63; Comín 2007, pp. 12-21).  
As pointed out by an OECD study, attempts to limit private consumption during 
expansionary cycles by increasing indirect taxes tended to fuel inflationary pressure on 
prices and wages, and the low share of direct taxes reduced considerably the role of the 
budget as an automatic stabilizer.3 Moreover the administration delegated assessment of 
the tax base to trade and professional groups, which caused persistent underestimation 
and reduced the responsiveness of tax revenue to changes in the state of the economy 
(OECD, January 1970, pp. 54-55).4 
Spending in turn was heavily biased towards government consumption. Wages, 
purchases and current transfers represented more than 60 per cent of total central 
government expenditure (almost 80 per cent in the 1950s). Indicative planning in the 
1960s triggered a significant expansion of gross capital formation thanks to public 
investment in housing and infrastructures, together with capital transfers in favour of 
public companies. On the other hand, spending on welfare schemes remained negligible 
and mainly oriented towards retirement benefits, family allowances and contributions to 
households’ medical spending (García Delgado 1982). 
A second problem was poor fiscal institutions. These were dominated by ‘revenue 
budgeting’, the rigidity of which was meant to control bureaucratic behaviour. Enquiries 
carried out in the last years of the autocratic regime uncovered poor economic 
information and systematic lack of coordination due to the ‘historic, monolithic self-
sufficiency of the Spanish ministries’. Developmental industrial policy based on 
French-style planning failed to discipline and coordinate budget spending with 
investment plans of INI and other autonomous bodies (Anderson 1970, pp. 73-4 and 
203-33; Medhurst 1973, pp. 160-165). Forecasts of economic trends, tax revenues and 
spending, and estimates of budget’s impact on domestic demand were neither 
centralized nor published. Biannual budgeting was too inflexible to be used for demand 
                                                           
3 The study was carried out in 1969 in response to the Report “Fiscal Policy for a Balanced 
Economy”, prepared by a group of OECD experts in 1968. 
4 Estimated income liable from the tax on individuals in 1957 was at least double that recorded 
by the tax authorities, according to the World Bank (1963, p. 117). 
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management, and the systematic use of supplementary and extraordinary expenditures 
made actual spending substantially diverge from spending targets (OECD, January 
1970, pp. 50-52).  
A third destabilizing characteristic of fiscal policy under Franco was a political 
economy which tended to generate pro-cyclical spending. The regime has been 
described as ‘a personalist authoritarian no-party political system…which tolerated a 
limited pluralism in which the conflicting demands of certain social groups (especially 
those which supported the regime) could be articulated by prominent individuals’ 
(Gunther 1980, p. 32). Policy-making within the Franco cabinets was dominated by 
coalitional politics, under which policy resulted from compromises between different 
factions and power contenders. Until the late 1960s, economic policy-making was 
shaped by the permanent tug of war between the ‘Falangist’ faction, which dominated 
syndicates (partly autonomous from the government) and was influential in state-
controlled companies, and the Europe-minded technocrats who favoured liberalization 
and a market-oriented policy.  
Until the late 1960s, booms tended to be exacerbated by expansionary fiscal policies. 
The economic buoyancy initiated in 1955 triggered mounting pressure by syndicates for 
a ‘more equitable distribution of national income’, while rising prices created social 
upheaval and repeated waves of strikes (EIU, n. 19, September 1956). The Falangist 
faction gained influence in the cabinet reshuffle of April 1956, and a populist increase 
in nominal wages in the public and private sectors was immediately decreed by the 
Ministry of Labour, triggering a classical wage-price spiral. Fiscal policy maintained an 
expansionary stance, and investment plans by INI, completely funded by the issue of 
public debt, peaked in 1957 (Schwartz and González 1978, pp. 81-82). Pressures in 
favour of a retrenchment of government spending were part of the anti-inflationary 
policy pursued by the liberal technocrats responsible for economic policy (Navarro 
Rubio and Ullastres). Early in 1958 government funding of INI was suspended and 
ordinary spending frozen, but public investment and capital transfers still increased by 
27 per cent over the previous year (EIU, Annual Supplement, July 1959). The budget 
deficit rose to 2 per cent of GDP, annual inflation hit 12 per cent, and a current account 
deficit emerged due to massive imports of raw materials, and consumption and capital 
goods. By early 1959 domestic and external imbalances had virtually eliminated foreign 
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exchange reserves and required international assistance (Carreras and Tafunell 2004, pp. 
319-24). The stabilization of the economy, enforced by the liberal technocrats under the 
supervision of the OECD, dictated a strong fiscal adjustment to eliminate excess 
internal demand, which exacerbated the ongoing recession (OECD, August 1960, p. 
20).  
The Stabilization Plan failed to eradicate this pro-cyclical bias. Fiscal discipline was 
again abandoned over the long expansionary cycle of 1961-66, which saw the 
implementation of the first Development Plan. Rapid growth of public sector 
expenditures remained a critical component of excess domestic demand (OECD, July 
1966, pp. 15-23). Massive public investment in the housing sector was paralleled by a 
boom of private spending, and large transfers from the Treasury to official credit 
institutions fuelled a credit boom. Nominal annual growth of total public spending 
peaked over 20 per cent in 1964-65, with investment and capital transfers accounting for 
one third of it (Beltrán and Oliart, 1967, pp. 69-70). By 1965 excess domestic demand 
had pushed inflation back to the 1958 levels, forcing the government to pursue an anti-
inflationary policy based on quantitative constraints on the annual expansion of 
domestic credit (EIU, n. 3, August 1966). Even the Bank of Spain, under the leadership 
of Navarro Rubio, a liberal technocrat and a former Minister of Finance, openly 
criticized the fiscal authorities in its annual reports, contending that “far from acting as a 
stabilizing factor, the public sector has tended to behave even more expansively the 
more inflationary trends made themselves felt” (BDE 1965 and 1966). Pressure from 
international organizations for fiscal restraint were compounded by increasing 
opposition by the business community to an anti-inflationary policy based exclusively 
on a credit squeeze which threatened to curb private investment and consumption 
indiscriminately. In fact, the government eventually delivered an austerity package—
including restraint in spending, increases in taxes on profits and luxury consumption, 
and a freezing of wages, prices and dividends—in coincidence with the Peseta 
devaluation of November 1967, even at the cost of aggravating the ongoing slowdown 
in private investment (EIU, n. 3, August 1967, and n. 4, December 1967; OECD, 
January 1969, pp. 16-18).  
The stabilization episode of 1967 consolidated the influence of the liberal technocrats 
and inclined the dispute over growth vs. macroeconomic stability in their favour. A 
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transition towards a different approach to fiscal policy finally emerged and new 
instruments of countercyclical intervention were also introduced. In 1969 a French-style 
automatic trip system was adopted, under which official action was required in case of 
excess growth of price indices, domestic credit and unemployment (or excess fall in 
international reserves or industrial production) (EIU, n. 1, February 1969). Unlike 
previous booms, fiscal restraint was maintained during the 1969-70 expansion in order 
to prevent overheating of the economy, against fast growth of money supply and new 
inflationary pressures. This policy succeeded in moderating demand growth and 
contributed to reverse a mounting current account deficit and expectations of a new 
devaluation of the Peseta (OECD, January 1971, pp. 5-15). When domestic demand 
weakened in the first half of 1971, the government switched to reflationary measures, 
including a massive increase in government spending for public investment and 
transfers to official credit institutions and tax rebates on private investment (EIU, n. 3, 
August 1971; OECD, January 1972, p. 14). The year 1971 marked another peak in 
government deficit (2.8 per cent of GDP); the same year saw also the first issue of 
public debt aiming at financing fiscal expansion with explicit countercyclical objectives, 
in response to a substantial drop of economic activity and a significant expansion of 
social security spending (Canseco 1978; Argimón et al. 1999, p. 55).  
Fiscal policy was finally modernized. In 1972 the government adopted annual 
budgeting and created special funds for investment projects (mostly in public works) 
available for immediate disbursement in case of alarming slack in domestic demand 
(EIU, n.1, January 1974). Fiscal stance in 1973-74 remained expansionary, with tax cuts 
on production and increasing subsidies to firms, in response to a slowdown in economic 
activity, aggravated by the reversal in expectations caused by the first oil shock 
(Argimón et al. 1999, p. 63). This countercyclical action was estimated to have offset 
two thirds of the contractionary pressure from the international crisis (Galy et al. 1993, 
p. 4), although inflation hovered around 15 per cent both in 1974 and 1975. By the start 
of the democratic transition, both the practice and the instruments of countercyclical 
fiscal policy seemed well established among Spanish authorities. 
Democratization marked a rapid transition from small to big government, a new 
political economy set-up and the definite modernization of fiscal institutions, though not 
without conflicts and delays. Social pressure in favour of a rapid reduction of the huge 
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gap in welfare provisions suffered by the Spanish population relative to European 
standards proved irresistible. A rapid convergence of social spending (including 
unemployment benefits) towards European levels was negotiated between the new 
democratic government, entrepreneurial organizations and labour unions under a neo-
corporatist agreement, the so called ‘Moncloa Pacts’ of 1977, in return for wage 
moderation. Together with welfare programmes, a substantial expansion of subsidies to 
private and public companies as means of favouring the conversion of the obsolete 
industrial sector, kept the rise of government expenditures well above the increase in tax 
revenues. On the other hand, public investment and capital transfers were gradually 
marginalized (González Páramo 1990; Valle 1990).  
The 1977-78 tax reform introduced a progressive income tax for individuals and 
companies. However the modernization of the tax administration and the struggle to 
reduce tax frauds were embraced half-heartedly by the weak centrist governments of 
1979-82, and gained momentum only after the Socialist victory in the 1982 elections. 
Reform of indirect taxation was opposed by business organizations and the introduction 
of a modern value added tax was delayed until 1986 (Fuentes Quintana 1990, pp. 478-
502; Comín 2007, pp. 24-40; for an overview, Martínez Vázquez and Sanz-Sanz 2007). 
A new budget act, approved in 1977, introduced three fundamental innovations in the 
instrumentation of fiscal policy: consolidated and refined accounts for the public sector, 
better coordination of investment by state-owned bodies with the government budget, 
and forecasting models of tax revenue (Canseco 1978, pp. 197-203). However, controls 
on public spending focused on procedural correctness, and evaluation and policy 
planning had to wait until the early 1980s, when budgets by programmes were 
introduced (Zapico Goñi 1988).  
The almost uninterrupted fiscal expansion of the decade 1975-85 moved 
countercyclically to the long depression suffered by the Spanish economy until the mid 
1980s, during which the contraction of private investment and the depression of 
domestic demand pushed unemployment from 8.6 percent in 1979 to 21.5 percent in 
1985 (Vázquez 1990). The stimulus provided by the public sector was meant partially to 
offset the impact on activity and employment of an increasingly restrictive monetary 
policy whose aim was to bring down inflation from the 20 per cent peak hit in 1977 and 
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make a fixed exchange rate sustainable (OECD, April 1979, pp. 20-21, and May 1981, 
pp. 19-20).5   
Fiscal expansion was reversed abruptly in 1985-86, coinciding with the accession to the 
EEC and the start of a new expansionary cycle of the economy. At the same time the 
pegged-but-adjustable exchange rate regime created by the European Monetary System 
had gained credibility and joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the system became 
a political priority for the Spanish government. Economic recovery facilitated 
countercyclical fiscal adjustment. Spending growth subsided and the tax burden 
increased thanks to the introduction of VAT and marginal reforms of income taxation. 
Official pegging of the Peseta to the Deutschmark was successfully achieved in 1989, 
just at the peak of the expansionary cycle, with a 6 percent fluctuation band, and 
maintained in the following two years, allowing Spain to sign the Maastricht Treaty at 
the end of 1991. Capital liberalization was part of the package, but what made a 
difference was fiscal adjustment and economic policy coordination within the 
framework of the hard EMS.  
To sum up, since the early 1970s the stabilizing properties of fiscal policy were 
enhanced by the introduction of automatic stabilizers, the modernization of fiscal 
institutions, changes in the interaction between the government and interest groups, and 
the discipline imposed by a pegged exchange rate. In the next section, we test 
empirically these hypotheses. 
 
3.  Estimating fiscal reaction functions: a tale of two regimes 
The previous narrative suggests that changes in the structural characteristics of the fiscal 
regime enhanced over time the stabilizing properties of fiscal policy and its use for 
                                                           
5 In fact, after the emergency devaluations of 1976 and 1977, the Spanish governments showed 
a persistent ‘fear of floating’. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classify the Peseta exchange rate as a 
de facto 2 per cent crawling band around the US dollar between 1973 and 1980, and around the 
Deutschmark until 1994. Ledesma et al. (2005) also find that a de facto peg to the Deutschmark 
prevailed between 1978 and 1984, and again between 1986 and the 1993 crisis, and was 
temporarily abandoned only in 1985 in response to speculative attacks in the wake of Spain’s 
accession to the EEC.  These results strongly suggest that Spanish monetary authorities worried 
about the pass-through from exchange rates to prices and systematically intervened to smooth 
fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate, even in the absence of a formal commitment to peg. 
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countercyclical purposes. Here we test formally whether fiscal policy contributed to the 
stabilization of the growth process by focusing on fiscal reaction functions (fiscal rules), 
that is, the discretionary and systematic response of governments to changes in the state 
of the economy.  
The most widely used indicator of the fiscal stance of the government is the cyclically 
adjusted GDP ratio of the primary balance, which allows to identify fiscal rules and 
shocks by eliminating the fully endogenous component of fiscal policy (Gali and Perotti 
2003; Fatas and Mihov 2009). Cyclical adjustment, however, requires precise and 
country-specific estimates of the elasticity of different categories of taxes and 
unemployment spending to cyclical fluctuations, constructed on the base of tax codes 
and the distribution of taxpayers—an information not available for Spain until the late 
1970s and hardly applicable backward due to the profound changes in the tax system in 
1977.6  Moreover, Kaminsky et al. (2004, pp. 7-9) demonstrate that the cyclicality of 
fiscal policy cannot be assessed unambiguously whenever the real primary balance or its 
GDP ratio are used.7 To address this problem, other studies (Lane 2003; Fatás and 
Mihov 2008) contend that pure ‘instruments’ of fiscal policy, such as real spending, are 
better able to capture the fiscal stance of the government and to discriminate between 
pro-cyclical (magnifying), countercyclical (stabilizing) and a-cyclical policies. 
For this reason, we use real primary spending of the central government net of social 
security expenditures as our indicator of the fiscal stance of the government. The 
exclusion of interest payments and unemployment benefits guarantees that, whatever 
cyclical behaviour we might observe, this measure should depend on discretionary 
responses, not on automatic stabilizers. Our main indicator of the state of the economy 
                                                           
6 Elasticities cannot be obtained by regressing tax revenues on output, since taxes have certainly 
a contemporaneous effect on output, especially at annual frequency, and estimates would be 
inconsistent. Elasticities estimated by the OECD for the 1980s and 90s are reported in van den 
Noord (2002). However, estimates of potential or trend output, as well as the systematic 
distortions introduced by estimated tax and spending elasticities in the cyclically-adjusted 
balances are controversial issues (Alberola et al. 2003: Mohr and Morris 2007). 
7 In the case of acyclical fiscal policy with constant tax rate and government expenditure, tax 
revenues and the primary balance are positively correlated with the cycle, but the GDP ratio of 
government expenditure is negatively correlated with the cycle, and the correlation of the GDP 
ratio of tax revenues is ambiguous, as it also turns the GDP ratio of primary balance.  With 
procyclical fiscal policy (identified by falling tax rate and increasing expenditure in good times), 
the correlation of tax revenues and their GDP ratio with the cycle is ambiguous (the tax rate 
falls but the tax base increases) and the same happens to the GDP ratio of the primary balance.  
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is the industrial production index. A particularly useful characteristic of industrial 
output is that, unlike real GDP (whose annual official estimates became available only 
in the early 1960s), it was observable both at annual and quarterly frequency by 
contemporary economic and political actors since the 1950s.8 (See Appendix for details 
on data and sources) 
Our benchmark approach to estimating the stabilising or destabilising impact of fiscal 
policy is to identify the reaction function by the shocks to a SVAR. Here we distinguish 
two types of structural shocks to identify the two functions, impact and reaction. One is 
a shock to the ‘impact’ equation (2), determining how output (aggregate supply and 
non-fiscal aggregate demand) responds to the fiscal variable (uy). The other is a shock to 
the reaction function (1), shifting the response of the fiscal variable to output (ug). We 
observe reduced form shocks (eit) to the fiscal variable and output from which the 
structural shocks are then inferred.  
In a two variable model consisting of the change in government spending g and the 
change in output y, the reduced-form VAR can be represented as 
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where Aij(L) is the autoregressive lag polynomial, and egt and eyt, the reduced form 
shocks, are linear combinations of the structural shocks ut. The structural form of model 
(6) can be expressed as 
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8 According to Prados de la Escosura (2003, pp. 203-205), the share of the industrial and 
constructions sector on total GDP at current prices hovered around 35 per cent for the whole 
period 1952-86. Its contribution to real GDP growth decreased from 50-55 per cent in 1952-74 
to ca. 33 per cent in the late 1980s. We prefer the industrial production index reported by INE 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística) and international organizations such as the IMF (see 
Appendix for details) to the historical series of real GDP and industrial production reconstructed 
by Prados de la Escosura since the former was observable by the government and economic 
agents, and is also comparable with industrial productions indices of other European countries 
reported by IMF. 
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Given that there exists a linear relationship between the observable and the structural 
residuals, tt Cue = , the structural shocks ut can be identified by first estimating the 
reduced form VAR and then transforming egt, eyt..  
Identification of these relations requires the introduction of one additional restriction on 
the matrix C, apart from the three short-run restrictions that structural innovations uit are 
orthonormal. We adopt the long-run restriction of Blanchard and Quah (1989) imposing 
that there is no long-run influence of pure innovations in the fiscal variable (gt) on 
aggregate demand or output growth (yt). We can rewrite the reduced form innovations: 
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Coefficients c(i) of matrix C represent the long-run response pattern of the variables to 
these two structural shocks. In particular c(2) represents the long-run cumulative 
response of the fiscal variable, government spending, to a uy shock. A positive 
coefficient c(2) indicates a destabilising fiscal reaction function, as an unanticipated  
boost to aggregate demand is matched by an increase in government expenditure. 
Alternatively, a negative coefficient denotes countercyclical behaviour of fiscal policy.  
Table 1 shows the estimates of the coefficients for the SVAR (g, y) before and after the 
transition to democracy. Consistently with our narrative, we find that the parameter 
capturing the cumulative response of primary spending to a structural output shock is 
positive and significant at the 5 per cent level under Franco, denoting pro-cyclicality, 
but turns countercyclical during the democratic period (negative and significant at 1 per 
cent level). As a robustness check, we repeat the analysis using quarterly data, available 
for government spending only from 1962 (see Appendix). Results based on this larger 
sample confirm a change in the sign of the spending reaction function. Estimates of the 
SVAR for different subperiods of the democratic era—before and after 1989, the date of 
entry of the Peseta into the European Monetary System—suggests a stronger counter-
cyclical response in the later period.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
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A word of caution about the timing of the transition from pro- to counter-cyclicality is 
warranted however.  Any change in the reaction function will not become apparent until 
sufficient cyclical behaviour of the economy has occurred to identify it. We could thus 
infer that the change must have occurred prior to 1975. In order to explore this issue, we 
estimate the SVAR and the reaction function parameter recursively. Figure 3 reveals the 
time pattern of the shift in the spending response of the government from destabilising 
to stabilising. The sudden loss of significance in the transition from the late 1960s to the 
early 1970s clearly suggests a change in the reaction function. Such change coincides 
chronologically with the process of modernization of fiscal policy identified in our 
narrative. 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
A more explicit assessment of whether the automatic stabilising properties of the tax 
function offset any destabilising government spending behaviour requires an extension 
to the model. No longer is taxation a part of the aggregate demand, impact or IS 
function. We assume that the spending decisions come first, and only afterwards do tax 
revenues follow them. So tax revenues depend eventually upon government spending, 
as well as on the tax base - income or output here. Government spending, as before is a 
reaction function, determined by output or income. In the short run the impact equation 
has a steeper gradient than in figure 1 because it does not include the effects of taxation. 
In the long run, output or income is independent of both taxation and government 
spending, which must be in some sort of equilibrium9  
More formally, three long-run additional restrictions are required to identify a system 
with a tax reaction function as well as the government spending function and aggregate 
demand. These are: 
- no long-run effect on output growth of a government spending shock  
- no long-run effect on output growth of a structural shock to tax revenues, uT   
- no long-run effect on government spending of a shock to tax revenues uT..  
                                                           
9 In a growing economy the stability of the debt‐gdp ratio depends upon the growth rate of the 
economy as well as upon  the deficit or surplus. 
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With these restrictions imposed the relation between the observed and the structural 
residuals is:  
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If c(4) <0  the fiscal reaction function is stabilizing. C(2) the response of tax revenues to 
government  spending in the long run  must be positive to be stabilising, as must be 
c(5), the response of tax revenues to  the tax base. C3 is tax shocks. Could these be 
destabilising? This depends on their timing and their impact on debt accumulation. A 
positive tax shock coefficient probably increases the stability of the system by reducing 
debt accumulation, whereas a negative effect – implying predominant tax cuts – is likely 
to be destabilising in the face of expansionary government spending.   
Table 2 confirms the previous results; primary spending reacts procyclically before the 
mid 1970s seventies and counter-cyclically afterwards. The positive and significant c(5) 
parameter is consistent with a stabilising contribution of the revenue side of the fiscal 
reaction function, though we cannot tell whether it is ‘automatic’ or discretionary 
policy10. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
A different approach, from the SVAR identification to the potential contemporaneous 
feedback from fiscal policy through aggregate demand to output is the method of 
instrumental variables (Gali and Perotti 2003; Alesina et al. 2008). We specify the 
following reaction function: 
gt = c + αyt + βRyt + ug        (7) 
where g is the growth rate of (log) real primary spending (net of unemployment 
benefits), R is a dummy capturing a change in the fiscal policy regime, y is the growth 
rate of (log) industrial production; and ug = Σρi ut-i + εt. Parameter α is the elasticity of 
                                                           
10  As  Kaminsky et al. (2004) note,  only if a negative C(5) parameter is obtained can  a 
(destabilising) discretionary tax policy be identified . A positive coefficient potentially reflects 
two types of behaviour. 
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spending to output and α>0 connotes a pro-cyclical reaction function. Parameter β is a 
measure of the impact of a new fiscal policy regime on the spending response to output. 
β<0 indicates that the new regime reduces the pro-cyclicality of spending. Finally, 
residuals ε are white-noise innovations that are orthogonal to the state of the economy 
and determine the overall volatility of the fiscal stance. The dispersion of these shocks, 
σε, measures the aggressiveness of idiosyncratic or non-systematic changes in fiscal 
policy (Fatás and Mihov 2008). A desirable feature of this approach is that it allows us 
to avoid breaking the sample in sub-periods and estimate fiscal shocks adjusted to 
shifting reaction functions for the whole period 1950-1998. To address potential 
endogeneity problems between spending and output, we estimate equation (7) by GMM 
and use the contemporaneous and lagged growth rate of industrial output in core 
European economies as instruments for domestic output.11 Results are presented in 
Table 3. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
Since our initial hypothesis was to test whether there was a change in the cyclical fiscal 
stance of the government across political regimes, we first introduce a ‘democracy’ 
dummy, taking the value of 1 after the conclusion of the democratic transition in 1976. 
Again we find that democratic governments brought in a significant fall in 
procyclicality (column 2). However, our narrative reveals that institutional rather than 
political regime changes could have determined the policy shift to countercyclicality. 
Therefore we test a set of additional dummies to capture the impact of a variety of 
possibly relevant factors. These include: the stabilisation plan (taking value 1 after 
1960), the adoption of annual budgeting and the creation of countercyclical funds (1 
after 1972), Spain’s accession to EEC (1 after 1986), and the peseta’s entry into the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS (1 after 1989). In principle, the two last events 
should have ‘tied’ the hands of the Spanish governments, thus reducing their scope for 
                                                           
11 The instrumental variable is a weighted industrial production index of five ‘core’ European 
economies (France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK). The first stage 
regression has good explanatory power (R2 0.47) with coefficients and t-stats: 0.622 (2.56**) 
and 0.768 (4.01***) of contemporaneous and lagged foreign output growth, respectively. Unit 
root tests confirm that the series are stationary. Autoregressive lags are selected on the base of 
standard (Akaike and Schwartz) criteria. 
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countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy. However, a government losing discretionary 
monetary policy may make increasing use of fiscal policy for stabilisation.  
Consistently with the narrative and the previous SVAR findings, our results suggest that 
the changes introduced in fiscal policy during the Franco regime in the early 1970s—
rather than the transition from autocracy to democracy—proved critical to reduce its 
pro-cyclicality (column 3). Joining the EMS in 1989, rather than the accession to EEC, 
apparently accounts for most of the countercyclical behaviour observed under the 
democratic regime (columns 4 and 5). Including a double countercyclical shift in the 
early 1970s and at the end of the 1980s yields consistent results and maximizes the 
explanatory power of our specification (column 6). This evidence confirms that the loss 
of discretion in the use of monetary policy indeed  led to a more energetic use of fiscal 
policy, in line with  Gali and Perotti’s (2003, pp. 17-18) finding for all EMU countries 
in the post-Maastricht period.  
These findings are robust to the use of quarterly data. The identification of a double 
countercyclical shift in fiscal policy is confirmed (column 7). Also, assuming a 
backward looking behaviour, in which governments, given the inertia and complexity of 
fiscal policy-making, responded to lagged fluctuations of the economy, does not change 
the results (column 8). Additionally, we test the hypothesis of fiscal policy being 
constrained by the level of outstanding government debt. In order to do so, we control 
for the lag of debt-GDP ratio in equation (7), which then becomes the reduced form of a 
structural model of the determination of government expenditure in which policymakers 
tend to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio around a target (Gali and Perotti 2003). In fact, in 
spite of evidence in favour of debt-constrained spending policy, the double shift to 
countercyclicality is confirmed (column 9). The same holds if we introduce election 
year dummies, which capture the possible existence of political budget cycles. Indeed 
we find evidence of significant political effects in fiscal policy (column 10). These 
results suggest that fiscal shocks were in part politically-driven and are consistent with 
the literature which argues in favour of political budget cycles in “young” democracies 
(Brender and Drazen 2005).12 
                                                           
12 Election year dummies are specified as 1 in the four quarters prior to a general election 
(including the quarter in which the election took place). We test for political budget cycles only 
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4. The attenuation of fiscal shocks 
We finally turn to the role played by the ‘aggressiveness’ of fiscal policy. Our objective 
is to test whether and to what extent discretionary fiscal shocks (ug) contributed to the 
volatility of the output process. Starting with the SVAR analysis, we first estimate the 
percentage of the variance of industrial production due to the structural fiscal shocks. As 
shown in Figure 4, the contribution of both spending and tax shocks to output volatility 
was maximized in the 1960s and declined significantly since the mid 1970s. The results 
suggest that fiscal (and especially spending) shocks were a significant determinant of 
growth volatility during the Franco period. 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
The aggressiveness of fiscal shocks can be measured more precisely by the residuals of 
the IV equation (7). We retrieve spending shocks from specification (6) of Table 3 in 
the previous section. We also retrieve tax shocks—that is, changes in tax revenues not 
related to the state of the economy—from a similar regression.13 As shown in Figure 5, 
discretionary fiscal policy unrelated to the state of the economy was much more 
aggressive and volatile in the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, than in the 
subsequent period. The model successfully identifies the large positive spending shocks 
and negative tax shocks that led to the 1959 crisis and the fiscal adjustment dictated by 
the stabilization plan of 1960-61. Data also uncover a destabilizing pattern typical of the 
Franco regime until the mid 1960s, under which positive (negative) spending shocks 
were systematically magnified by discretionary tax cuts (increases). This pattern was 
subsequently abandoned, with spending and tax shocks generally moving in the same 
direction, although not with equal magnitude. The long period of fiscal expansion that 
prevailed until the early 1980s was nevertheless characterized by relatively moderate 
                                                                                                                                                                              
using quarterly data because most Spanish elections were held in the first half of the year, so 
that an annual dummy would capture both pre- and post-election fiscal shocks. An additional 
problem with annual dummies is the limited number of observations and the absence of 
sufficient degrees of freedom. 
13 In this case, the cyclicality parameter captures both the automatic and the discretionary 
systematic component of tax revenues. We find a value very close to 1 (0.874, p-value 0.000). 
Dummies for the tax reforms of 1964 and 1977 are not statistically significant.  
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shocks with much lower volatility. The aggressiveness of discretionary fiscal policy 
increased during the fiscal adjustment of the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
In order empirically to test whether and to what extent changes over time in the 
“aggressiveness” of discretionary fiscal policy contributed to output volatility, a model 
of growth volatility must be specified. Recent empirical studies use ARCH or GARCH 
models, where output growth is a standard autoregressive process and the conditional 
variance of growth depends on past volatility and forecast variance. Fiscal shocks are 
then entered as explanatory variables of the conditional variance (Badinger 2006).  
As argued in recent studies however (Cecchetti et al. 2006; Fang et al. 2008; Fang and 
Miller 2009), the assumption of a stable GARCH process may prove unwarranted if 
there are structural changes in mean growth or in growth volatility. Therefore we 
control for structural breaks in the μ , the underlying growth rate, of the following mean 
equation  
Δyt = μ + ρ Σ Δyt-i + εt     (8) 
where y is the (log) of the industrial production index, , ρ is a persistence parameter, Δ 
is a first difference operator, i indicates time lags, and ε  is a white-noise error with 
variance σε.14 A structural break test unequivocally identifies a shift in the mean of the 
growth process in 1975, consistent with the standard narrative of Spanish economic 
performance (Marcet and Ravn 2004: 9-11),15 and heteroskedasticity tests of the 
residuals reject the hypothesis of constant variance.16  
Equation (9) is the one-period ahead forecast variance   
σ2t = ω + αε2t-1 + βσ2t-1 + φ shocks^2  (9) 
                                                           
14 Lag selection Akaike and Scwartz criteria suggest an AR(2) process. 
15 A Quandt-Andrews test of unknown break point reports maximum LR F-statistics in 1975 
with 33.34 value and 0.000 p-value. 
16 Residuals exhibit some negative skewness (-0.425) and excess kurtosis (3.861), but p-values 
of empirical distribution tests confirm normality. Ljung-Box Q-statistics and Breusch-Godfrey 
tests reject serial correlation. On the contrary, White, Harvey and Glejser tests reject 
homoskedasticity with probability of F-stat 0.0767, 0.0475, and 0.0374 respectively. A BDS 
(Brock, Dechert, Scheinkman) test of independence also rejects the hypothesis of independent 
and identically distributed residuals. 
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where the conditional variance of output growth, σ2t , is dependent on the information 
set available in the previous period (Ωt-1), α is the ARCH parameter for lagged squared 
residuals, β a GARCH parameter for lagged forecast variance, and φ a parameter 
capturing the impact of the volatility of fiscal shocks on the conditional volatility of the 
growth process.17 We find no ARCH effects but highly persistent conditional variance. 
As shown in Figure 6, the declining pattern of growth conditional variance tracks the 
falling “aggressiveness” of purely discretionary fiscal shocks in the transition from the 
1960s to the 1970s.  
FIGURE 6 HERE 
The high persistence of the GARCH process may signal the existence of a structural 
shift in growth variance. Recursive estimates of the ω parameter confirm its instability, 
and an unknown breakpoint test reveals the existence of a structural break in 1965 
(Figure 7, left hand panel). Therefore we alternatively specify a Component-GARCH 
(C-GARCH) model of output growth, in which the constant ‘ω’ is replaced by a time-
varying parameter, m, allowing for shifting long-run volatility:  
 σ2t = m + α (ε2t-1 – mt-1) + β (σ2t-1 – mt-1)  (10) 
 m = ω + χ (mt-1 – ω) + ψ (ε2t-1 – σ2t-1)  (11) 
where (10) represents a transitory component of volatility converging to zero with 
powers (α+β), and (11) a long-term component converging to zero with powers of ρ. As 
shown in the right hand panel of Figure 7, the model adequately captures the downward 
transition of the permanent component of volatility from the 1960s to the 1970s, and 
provides clear evidence of heteroscedasticity in the transitory component and its 
stabilization in the second half of the 1960s. 
FIGURE 7 HERE 
To test for the impact of the aggressiveness of fiscal policy on growth, we include 
squared fiscal shocks as independent variable in the variance equation of both the 
GARCH and the C-GARCH model. Table 4 shows the results.  
                                                           
17 Conditions α, β ≥ 0, and α+β (a measure of the persistence of shocks to conditional variance) 
< 1 must hold to ensure positive and stable conditional variance. 
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TABLE 4 HERE 
In the case of GARCH, both spending and tax shocks have a positive impact on 
variance and enter equation (5) at the 1 per cent level of significance.18 In the C-
GARCH model, fiscal shocks enter positively and significantly in the permanent 
component of growth volatility, although with a smaller magnitude of their parameters. 
These results confirm that part of the high volatility of output growth before the mid-
1960s was due to strong fiscal shocks, and that the subsequent moderation of 
discretionary fiscal policy contributed to a structural stabilization of the output growth 
process. 
 
Conclusion 
Was fiscal policy destabilizing? Yes it was during most of the Franco period, both 
because of the policy reaction function and because of the ‘aggressiveness’ of 
discretionary fiscal shocks. By the mid seventies systematic fiscal policy had turned 
stabilising and the volatility of fiscal shocks had radically diminished.  After 1989, and 
entry to the EMS, there is evidence that the stabilising properties of the reaction 
function increased. This was accompanied by a slight increase in the aggressiveness of 
fiscal shocks, probably because of the fiscal adjustment necessary to satisfy the 
convergence criteria. On balance, for Spain we think it would be incorrect to attribute 
the greater stability of the economy from the 1980s to a ‘Great Moderation’ of monetary 
policy. 
Our analytical narrative emphasises the key structural elements that shaped the time-
varying impact of fiscal policy on output fluctuations: expanding government, greater 
progressiveness of taxation, and wider coverage as well generosity of welfare 
provisions, suggest that the automatic stabilizing role of fiscal policy should have 
increased over time. Other factors contributed to diminish the impact of discretionary 
spending shocks on the economy: first, the progressive shift of government 
expenditures away from spending categories with a relatively higher fiscal multiplier, 
                                                           
18 As a robustness check we also specify the mean equation in two slightly different ways:  Δyt 
= μ + εt, with  εt = ρi Σε t-i + vt. The results do not change. 
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such as investment and capital transfers; second, the increasing openness of the Spanish 
economy, with substantial leakages towards imports.  
We also find that in the Spanish case a transition to countercyclical policy occurred in 
the late years of the Franco’s regime, contributing to the stabilization of the growth 
pattern. The timing of the shift, between the late 1960s and early 1970s, was not 
determined by a single policy change, but rather by gradual pressure from economic 
liberalization, the external constraint imposed by a fixed exchange rate regime and the 
modernization of fiscal policy’s instruments. We finally provide evidence that the 
magnitude of discretionary fiscal shocks decreased over time, thus contributing to the 
progressive stabilization of output growth. 
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APPENDIX: Data and sources 
Fiscal variables 
Annual 
Estadísticas Históricas de España. Siglos XIX-XX, A. Carreras, X. Tafunell, eds. (Fundación 
BBVA, 2005), c. 12, F. Comín, D. Diaz, “Sector público administrativo y estado del bienestar”, 
vol. II, pp. 873-964 
Central government tax revenues: 
1950-61, Table 12.16 “Ingresos del Estado: clasificación económica”, p. 940 [includes: indirect 
and direct tax revenue, monopolies, other current revenue (transfers among public 
administrations and other current transfers), capital tax revenues]. 
1962-98, Table 12.21 “Estado: ingresos corrientes y de capital (movimiento de caja), 
clasificación económica”, p. 948 [includes: indirect and direct tax revenue, current and capital 
transfers, interest revenue, dividends and other]. This series corresponds to the data reported in 
IMF International Financial Statistics, “Total revenue and grants”, ifs:s18481y.zf. 
Central government expenditures: 
1950-61, Table 12.17 “Gastos del Estado: clasificación económica”, p. 943. 
1962-98, Table 12.22 “Estado: gastos corrientes y de capital (movimiento de caja), clasificación 
económica”, p. 949 [includes wages, purchases, current and capital transfers, investment, 
interest payments, other expenditures]. This series corresponds (with minor discrepancies) to the 
data reported in IMF International Financial Statistics, “Expenditures” (net of lending and 
repayments), ifs:s18482zfa. 
Social security: 1958-98, Table 12.31 “Cuentas de la Seguridad Social”, pp. 958-59 
Government debt: 1950-98, Table 12.34 “Deuda pública en circulación”, pp. 962-63. 
Quarterly 
IMF International Financial Statistics 
Central government tax revenues (1962Q1-1998Q4): ifs: s18481zfq 
Central government expenditures (1962Q1-1998Q4): ifs: s18482zfq 
Government debt (1958Q3-1998Q4): ifs: s18488zfq 
 
Wholesale Price Index 
Annual 
IMF International Financial Statistics (1950-1998): ifs: s18463zf 
Quarterly 
IMF International Financial Statistics (1959Q1-1998Q4): ifs: s18463zfq 
 
Industrial Production Index 
Annual 
Spain (1950-1998): Estadísticas Históricas de España. Siglos XIX-XX, A. Carreras, X. Tafunell, 
eds. (Fundación BBVA, 2005), c. 5, A. Carreras, “Industria”, vol. I, pp. 357-964, Table 5.11 
“Índices de la producción industrial”, Series INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística). This series 
tracks (with minor discrepancies) the industrial production index (s.a.) reported from 1960 by 
IMF International Financial Statistics, ifs: s18466czfa. 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and UK (1950-1998): IMF International Financial 
Statistics, ifs: s13266czf, s13466czf, s13866czf, s12466bzf, s11266czf, respectively. 
Quarterly 
Spain: IMF International Financial Statistics (1961Q1-1998Q4): ifs: s18466czfq  
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and UK (1957Q1-1998Q4): IMF International 
Financial Statistics, s13266czfq, s13466czfq, s13866czfq, s12466bzfq, s11266czfq, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1 
Fiscal Reaction Functions 
 
 
 
Figure 2  
The historical evolution of the Spanish fiscal regime, 1950‐1998 
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Figure 3 
Shifting reaction function 
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Note. See Table 1. Recursive estimation starting with the whole sample and gradually  focusing  in the  last 
years by eliminating the first ones (1951‐1998… 1990‐1998). P‐value: discontinuous line. 
 
 
Figure 4 
Recursive estimate of IPI‐growth variance decomposition 
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5‐year horizon. A recursive estimate based on trivariate SVAR (Δexp, Δrev,  ΔIPI ) gives the same results. 
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Figure 5 
Discretionary fiscal shocks 
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Notes. Normalized spending and tax shocks are residuals from instrumental variable (GMM) estimates of central 
government’s reaction functions for primary spending and tax revenues, respectively. Net shocks are spending 
shocks minus tax shocks. Data and sources: see Appendix. 
 
Figure 6 
Fiscal shocks and conditional output variance 
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
.06
.07
.0005
.0010
.0015
.0020
.0025
.0030
.0035
.0040
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
conditional variance of ipi growth
squared spending shocks
squared tax shocks
squared net shocks
variance
sq
ua
re
d 
sh
oc
ks
 
Notes. Conditional variance obtained  from a GARCH model of  industrial output growth. Fiscal shocks are squared 
residuals of instrumental variable estimates of reaction function (see Figure 5). Data and sources: see Appendix. 
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Figure 7 
A C‐GARCH model of industrial output growth 
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Data and sources: see Appendix. 
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Table 1 
Fiscal reaction functions: bivariate SVAR 
 
SVAR (Δexp, ΔIPI) – Annual data  c(1)  c(2)  c(3) 
 
LR acc response of 
Δexp to ug shocks 
LR acc response of 
Δexp to uy shocks 
LR acc response of 
ΔIPI to uy shocks 
1951‐1975  0.050  (0.0000)  0.024 (0.0247)  0.046  (0.0000) 
1976‐1998 
 
0.055  (0.0000) 
 
‐0.048  (0.0004) 
 
0.039  (0.0000) 
 
SVAR (Δexp, ΔIPI) – Quarterly data  c(1)  c(2)  c(3) 
 
LR acc response of 
Δexp to ug shocks 
LR acc response of 
Δexp to uy shocks 
LR acc response of 
ΔIPI to uy shocks 
1964:2‐1975:4  0.032  (0.0000)  0.025 (0.0000)  0.023  (0.0000) 
1976:1‐1998:4  0.030  (0.0000)  ‐0.012  (0.0002)  0.017  (0.0000) 
    1976:1‐1989:4  0.029  (0.0000)  ‐0.009  (0.0256)  0.015  (0.0000) 
    1990:1‐1998:4  0.009  (0.0000)  ‐0.019  (0.0000)  0.026  (0.0000) 
 
Notes. Unit root tests (not reported) confirm that the series are stationary. Annual data with 2 lags; 
quarterly data (only available since 1962) with 8 lags; autoregressive lags are selected on the base of 
Akaike and Schwarz criteria; p‐values in parentheses. Data and sources: see Appendix. 
 
 
Table 2 
Fiscal reaction function: trivariate SVAR 
 
Tri‐SVAR (Δexp, 
Δtaxrev, ΔIPI) 
c(1)  c(2)  c(3)  c(4)  c(5)  c(6) 
 
LR acc 
response of 
Δexp to a ug 
shock 
LR acc 
response of 
Δtaxrev to a 
ug shock 
LR acc 
response of 
Δtaxrev to a 
uy shock 
LR acc 
response of 
Δexp to a uy 
shock 
LR acc 
response of 
Δtaxrev to a 
uy shock 
LR acc 
response of 
ΔIPI to a uy 
shock 
1951‐1975 
0.048 
(0.0000) 
0.018 
(0.0221) 
0.038 
(0.0000) 
0.026 
(0.0103) 
0.019 
(0.0285) 
0.048 
(0.0000) 
1976‐1998 
0.058 
(0.0000) 
0.030 
(0.0216) 
0.060 
(0.0000) 
‐0.044 
(0.0014) 
0.024 
(0.0938) 
0.039 
(0.0000) 
 
Notes. Annual data with 2 lags, autoregressive lags selected on the base of Akaike and Schwarz criteria; 
p‐values in parentheses. Data and sources: see Appendix. 
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Table 3 
Fiscal Reaction Function: instrumental variables 
 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
growth rate of real primary spending lagged output debt constrained elections
constant 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ipi 0.388*** 0.483*** 0.464*** 0.404*** 0.470*** 0.494*** 0.323*** 0.335*** 0.356*** 0.587***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ipi * democracy (1976) ‐1.906*** ‐‐1.524*** ‐1.064*** ‐0.537 0.046
(0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.300) (0.903)
ipi * stabilization plan (1960) ‐0.094
(0.581)
ipi * annual budget (1972) ‐0.675*** ‐0.470*** ‐0.604*** ‐0.469*** ‐0.651*** ‐0.851***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ipi * EEC accession (1986) ‐0.506
(0.390)
ipi * peseta in EMS (1989) ‐1.507*** ‐1.485*** ‐1.214*** ‐1.394*** ‐0.426** ‐0.904***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000)
lagged debt/GDP ‐0.023***
(0.001)
election 1977 0.008**
(0.032)
election 1979 0.034***
(0.000)
election 1982 0.005**
(0.018)
election 1986 0.010***
(0.000)
election 1989 0.034***
(0.000)
AR 2 2 2 2 2 2 7 7 7 7
R‐squared 0.064 0.126 0.153 0.197 0.241 0.285 0.687 0.669 0.701 0.721
J‐stat 0.139 0.176 0.156 0.151 0.155 0.142 0.116 0.117 0.131 0.160
overid p‐value 0.038 0.016 0.026 0.029 0.026 0.035 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
sample 1952‐98 1952‐98 1952‐98 1952‐98 1952‐98 1952‐98 1964Q1‐1998Q4 1964Q1‐1998Q4 1964Q1‐1998Q4 1964Q1‐1998Q4
observations 47 47 47 47 47 47 140 140 140 140
frequency annual annual annual annual annual annual quarterly quarterly quarterly quarterly  
 
Note.  Autoregressive  lags  selected  on  the  base  of  Akaike  and  Schwarz  criteria;  p‐values  among 
parenthesis.  GMM  estimated  with  Bartlett  kernel,  fixed  Newey‐West  bandwith,  and  prewithening. 
Instruments are the contemporaneous and lagged growth rate of a weighted industrial production index 
of 5 European core economies, plus  lagged dependent variable and regressors. Data and sources: see 
Appendix. 
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Table 4 
The effect of fiscal shocks on growth volatility 
 
             GARCH model                 C‐GARCH model
spending tax spending spending tax tax
shocks shocks shocks shocks shocks shocks
mean equation mean equation
c 0.144*** 0.133*** c 0.114*** 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.122***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
dum75 ‐0.113*** ‐0.111*** dum75 ‐0.090*** ‐0.092*** ‐0.095*** ‐0.099***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Δy(‐1) ‐0.061 ‐0.077 Δy(‐1) 0.072 0.006 ‐0.048 ‐0.055
(0.66) (0.47) (0.288) (0.948) (0.351) (0.571)
Δy(‐2) ‐0.462*** ‐0.403*** Δy(‐2) ‐0.240*** ‐0.287*** ‐0.277*** ‐0.260***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
variance equation transitory variance
α 0.029 0.064 α 0.301*** 0.317* 0.599*** 0.357*
(0.84) (0.47) (0.000) (0.071) (0.008) (0.078)
β 0.463*** 0.048 β ‐0.993*** ‐0.705** ‐0.455*** ‐0.048
(0.000) (0.53) (0.000) (0.044) (0.000) (0.826)
φ 0.236*** 0.321*** φ ‐0.004 0.075***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.904) (0.007)
permanent variance
ω 0.000 0.000*** ‐0.0001*** 0.0005***
(0.768) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
χ 0.827*** 0.824*** 0.679*** 0.815***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ψ 0.312 ‐0.038 ‐0.574*** ‐0.393***
(0.450) (0.633) (0.001) (0.010)
φ 0.033** 0.108***
(0.050) (0.000)
R2 0.485 0.490 R2 0.511 0.515 0.505 0.526
Adj R2 0.393 0.399 Adj R2 0.392 0.397 0.384 0.411  
 
